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Fair Dealing for the Purpose of Education:

York University v The Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency
Pascale Chapdelaine
1. Introduction
In York University v The Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (“Access Copyright”),1 the
Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) was confronted with two issues at the heart of ongoing
debates in Canadian copyright law. The first is whether tariffs of copyright collective
societies are mandatory, a question that was not addressed by courts at such length in
recent times.2 The second issue, and primary focus of this comment, concerns the
application of fair dealing for the purpose of education to York (and other educational
institutions). Recently added to the Copyright Act3 fair dealing for the purpose of education
had not been dealt with by courts prior to this litigation opposing Access Copyright and
York.

Since the FCA decision was issued in April 2020, both Access Copyright and York
applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court were granted.4 The Supreme Court



April 5, 2021. Updated version to previous comment:Pascale Chapdelaine, “Fair Dealing for the Purpose
of Education: York University v The Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency” (March 10, 2021), online:
SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808146 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3808146>; Associate
Professor/Professeure agrégée, University of Windsor, Faculty of Law. I thank Ariel Katz, David Vaver,
Myra Tawfik, Olivier Charbonneau, and the participants of a webinar organized by the University of
Alberta during Fair Dealing Week in February 2021, for helpful discussions and comments on earlier
versions of this case comment. I thank Nicole Laberge (Windsor Law JD 2022) and Samuel Abbott
(Windsor Law JD 2021) for great research assistance and editing work.
1 York University v The Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (“Access Copyright”), 2020 FCA 77 [FCA
decision].
2 Ibid at paras 195-199 (the FCA citing previous decisions where tariffs were enforced against copyright
infringers, often through default judgments or where the (non)mandatory nature of tariff was not
discussed at length). The FCA refers to and applies various decisions relevant to the enforceability of
tariffs including the more recent Supreme Court decision: Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. SODRAC 2003
Inc, 2015 SCC 57.
3 RSC, 1985, c C-42 [the Act]; Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20, s. 21 (amended fair dealing
provisions by adding the allowable purpose of education to other purposes).
4 York University, et al. v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency ("Access Copyright"), et al. (15 October
2020), Canada, SCC 39222 (Applications for Leave), online: <https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-lcsc-a/en/18507/1/document.do>.
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decision is highly anticipated given the stakes involved for educational institutions and
users of copyright works more generally, as well as for copyright collective societies and
the copyright holders they represent.

Starting with an overview of the litigation, the comment will contextualize Access
Copyright’s licences and Interim Tariff,5 York’s decision to opt out of it, and York’s Fair
Dealing Guidelines (Guidelines). It will then proceed to analyse the two main issues at
hand. First, I briefly look at the implications of the (non)mandatory nature of tariffs for
Access Copyright and other collective societies generally. Second and the greater focus
of this comment, I examine the challenges of applying fair dealing for the purpose of
education to large institutions and in particular, to institutional practices such as the
Guidelines implemented by York.
While fair dealing has been characterized as a “user right” by the Supreme Court in CCH
Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada6 and subsequent decisions,7 this comment
points to some of the shortcomings of fair dealing as the vehicle to promote access to
educational materials. It highlights how the Federal Court (FC) and FCA failed to take into
account important contextual elements of York Guidelines that might have led to different
conclusions. It provides some guidance on how fair dealing for the purpose of education
should be interpreted. I conclude by highlighting the challenges that lie ahead on the
application of fair dealing to educational institutions, and by broadening the debate of
access to educational materials beyond the fair dealing doctrine.

2. Background to Litigation
Access Copyright is a collective society that administers reproduction rights in published
literary works, including the collection and distribution of royalties with respect to copyright
works in Access Copyright’s repertoire. From 1994 to 2010, Access Copyright and York
5

See infra note 10.
2004 SCC 13 at para 48 [CCH].
7 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36 at para
11[SOCAN]; Alberta v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency, 2012 SCC 37 at para 22 [Alberta
Education]; Keatley Surveying Ltd. v. Teranet Inc., 2019 SCC 43 at paras 44-46 [Keatley].
6
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had a licence agreement that allowed York to reproduce portions of textbooks found in
Access Copyright’s repertoire. In March 2010, Access Copyright submitted a tariff for
approval to the Copyright Board (“Proposed Tariff”) with respect to post-secondary
educational institutions covering the years 2011-2013.8 The Proposed Tariff contained a
new royalty rate model, and was subject to several objections.9 With the fast approaching
expiry of the licence agreement, Access Copyright sought approval for an interim tariff
(the “Interim Tariff”) from the Copyright Board. The Copyright Board granted Access
Copyright’s application and the Interim Tariff came into force on January 1, 2011.10 The
Interim Tariff incorporated the royalty rates of the licence agreement between Access
Copyright and York. Initially, York complied with the Interim Tariff. In July 2011 however,
York notified Access Copyright it would opt-out from the Interim Tariff. Access Copyright
commenced an action to enforce the Interim Tariff and alleged York infringed the
copyright of works in its repertoire. York filed a counterclaim for a declaration that any
reproductions made followed its Guidelines and therefore benefited from the fair dealing
exception under the Act.11 The FC held that Access Copyright’s Interim Tariff was
mandatory and hence enforceable against York. The Court also dismissed York’s
counterclaim and held that York Guidelines were not fair.12

York appealed the FC decision on the mandatory nature of the Interim Tariff and
challenged FC’s finding that copies of works made under its Guidelines did not amount

8

Copyright Board, (2010) C Gaz I (Supp), online: https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2010/2010-06-12/pdf/g114424.pdf (Statement of Proposed Royalties).
9 FCA decision, supra note 1 at para 8.
10 Re Access Copyright - Interim Tariff for Post-Secondary Educational Institution, 2011-2013 (23
December 2010), online: Copyright Board of Canada https://decisia.lexum.com/cbcda/decisions/en/item/366699/index.do?q=Access+Copyright+interim+tariff+december+23+2010; Re
Access Copyright - Interim Tariff for Post-Secondary Educational Institutions, 2011-2013 (16 March
2011), online: Copyright Board of Canada < https://decisia.lexum.com/cbcda/decisions/en/item/366712/index.do> (Interim Tariff as amended) [Interim Tariff].
11 Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency v. York University, 2017 FC 669 at para 2 (Declaration sought
with respect to all reproductions of copyright works made before April 8, 2013 and thereafter, and with
respect to all relevant copyright works within and beyond Access Copyright’s repertoire) [FC decision].
12 See Ariel Katz, “Access Copyright v. York University: An Anatomy of a Predictable But Avoidable Loss”
(27 July 2017), online: University of Toronto Faculty of Law Blog
<www.law.utoronto.ca/blog/faculty/access-copyright-v-york-university-anatomy-predictable-avoidableloss> (for a detailed analysis of the FC decision, in particular on the relationship between Access
Copyright’s claim and York’s counterclaim).
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to fair dealing under the Act.13 The FCA, under the pen of Justice Pelletier, overturned
the FC decision and held that tariffs approved by the Copyright Board are consensual in
nature and hence not mandatory on users of the relevant copyright works. As a result,
Access Copyright’s Interim Tariff is not enforceable against York who had opted out of it.
As Access Copyright’s standing is limited to enforcing its tariffs and licences, and does
not extend to suing users directly for copyright infringement,14 Access Copyright had no
other cause of action against York. With respect to the declaratory relief sought by York,
the FCA upheld the FC decision that York Guidelines are not fair.15

3. Contextualizing York’s Opting-Out from Access Copyright Interim Tariff
The fact that York did not renew a licence agreement (and subsequently opted out from
the Interim Tariff) under which York paid fees to Access Copyright for over 16 years,
played a large, albeit not overt role in the FC and FCA decisions. On the one hand, the
FCA confirmed that York’s opting out from the Interim Tariff as a non-mandatory
instrument was legitimate. On the other hand, the same court endorsed FC’s assessment
that the opting out by York (and other educational institutions) of paying fees to Access
Copyright had a major detrimental impact on the educational material publishers’ market.
York’s main motivations to opt out of Access Copyright’s Interim Tariff and to implement
its Guidelines were characterized negatively as a way for York to “to obtain for free that
which [it] had previously paid for”.16 York’s interruption of the licence to Access
Copyright’s repertoire tainted the fair dealing analysis portion of the FC and FCA
decisions to York’s detriment.

Neither the FC or FCA decision situated Access Copyright licence (and Interim Tariff) and
York’s Guidelines for fair dealing in the broader context of York’s yearly expenditures for

13

Act, supra note 3, s 29.
Supra note 1 at para 205. This is pursuant to the agreements between Access Copyright and the
copyright holders for which it acts. This is unlike other copyright collectives such as SOCAN, who by the
terms of their agreements with the authors they represent, can sue alleged infringers directly for copyright
infringement as well as enforce the tariffs and user licences they conclude on behalf of their members:
ibid, at para 197.
15 See below section 5. “Fair dealing in Canadian Copyright Law”.
16 See e.g. FCA decision, supra note 1 at para 240.
14
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library materials. The overall amounts for digital collection licences and printed books that
York paid annually to various publishers during the relevant period were not highlighted
in either decision.17 Nor did it transpire from the reasons on the fairness of York’s
Guidelines that expenditures for library materials have continued to increase over the
years, for York as well as for other Canadian post-secondary educational institutions.18
York and other educational institutions decision to opt out from Access Copyright’s licence
(and subsequently Interim Tariff) should be examined in the context of the dramatic shift
in the last decades toward publishers’ licensing of online digital collections that cover a
significant portion of educational institution user needs. For a large part of scientific fields
and knowledge, the more recent materials (increasingly available in digital format through
publisher transactional licences) hold the bulk of educational value as older materials
quickly become outdated. In this context, the relevance of Access Copyright’s licences
and Interim Tariff to its repertoire (which could be relevant e.g. with respect to
reproductions of older printed books not yet in the public domain and not covered by the
digital licences) has and will considerably decline over time relative to the needs of York
and other educational institutions.19 The impact of the various publishers’ licences that
York and other educational institutions subscribe to, on Access Copyright’s licences and
Interim Tariff, was not explored by the FC and FCA.20 On that front, the lack of

17

2012-2013 Statistics, 3, online (pdf): Canadian Association of Research Libraries <www.carlabrc.ca/doc/2013_CARLABRC_Stats_no_sans_Comment.pdf.>. For the initial period covered by the
litigation opposing Access Copyright to York, York spent over $12,105,040.00 in library materials,
including for digital licences and printed books (i.e. part of 2011 to 2013).
18 2017-2018 Statistics (December 2019), online (pdf): Canadian Association of Research Libraries
www.carl-abrc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/CARL-ABRC_Stats_Pub_2017-18.pdf. For the period
2017-2018, last available report, York spent $13,310.588.00; total expenditures for library materials in
Canada overall were $355,886,675.00 compared to $289,191,995 in 2012-2013).
19 Several educational institutions have opted out from Access Copyright’s licences: see Statements of
royalties to be collected by access copyright for the reprographic reproduction, in Canada, of works in its
repertoire, Post-Secondary Educational Institutions (2011-2014; 2015-2017) (6 December 2019), CBCDA 2019-082 at para 204, online: Copyright Board <decisions.cb-cda.gc.ca/cbcda/decisions/en/item/453965/index.do> [Approved Tariff Decision]. See Michael Geist, “Why
Universities Should Not Sign the Access Copyright – AUCC Model Licence” (24 May 2012) online:
Michael Geist <https://www.michaelgeist.ca/2012/05/access-copyright-model-licence/> (listing various
reasons why Universities do not need to sign a licence with Access Copyright, including the large
increase of open source journals and materials made available online).
20 The impact of the interaction between third party transactional licences and Access Copyright’s Tariff
was raised by York before Copyright Board in proceedings leading to approval of Access Copyright final
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transparency and disclosure regarding the content of Access Copyright’s repertoire has
been a point of contention and an important obstacle to assessing the overall value of
Access Copyright licences and tariffs.21

In parallel to major shifts in the market with increased online access to licensed digital
education materials, the scope of fair dealing has broadened in the last two decades, with
the addition of allowable purposes in the Act, and as a user right, calling for a large and
liberal interpretation of its application.22 The scope of the specific user rights for
educational institutions has also expanded, notably with respect to works available
through the Internet.23 As a result of these developments, several educational institutions
across the country have adopted fair dealing Guidelines modelled on the AUCC
guidelines24 to articulate fair dealing as a user right for the benefit of their students and
faculty members within the confines of the law.25 This expansion of user rights under the
Act should necessarily impact the overall value of Access Copyright’s licence to
educational institutions downwards.26 It is in the light of these two important developments
that Access Copyright’s licence and Interim Tariff, York’s decision to opt out of it, and
York fair dealing Guidelines need to be assessed. With these preambles in mind, I now
turn to the two legal issues addressed by the FCA.

tariff for post-secondary educational institutions. Copyright Board refused to consider this interaction for
lack of evidence provided by York: Approved Tariff Decision, supra note 19 at paras 272, 275,278-279
295.
21 The accessibility of Access Copyright’s repertoire was raised by the Canadian Association of Research
Libraries, asking the Copyright Board to mandate Access Copyright to disclose its repertoire. The Board
declined to make a decision on that point: Approved Tariff Decision, supra note 19 at paras 348-349,351.
22 Supra note 6, 7.
23 Act, supra note 3, s. 30.04 (allowing educational institutions to reproduce, perform other acts, of works
available online without copyright holders’ authorization, subject to meeting listed conditions).
24 Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) (now Universities Canada). See FCA
decision, supra note 1 at para 12.
25 See Rumi Graham, “Recalibrating Some Copyright Conceptions: Toward a Shared and Balanced
Approach to Educational Copying” (2014) 9:2 Partnership: The Canadian Journal of Library and
Information Practice and Research, online: <doi.org/10.21083/partnership.v9i2.3127> (on the need to
rethink the traditional model of reprographic blanket licences for educational institutions in light of fair
dealing jurisprudential developments and amendments to the Act).
26 Approved Tariff Decision, supra note 19 at paras 210-216.
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4. The Non-Mandatory Nature of Access Copyright Interim Tariff
The first issue facing the FCA was whether tariffs of AC and other collective societies are
mandatory. In his reasons, Justice Pelletier recognized two distinct regimes under which
a copyright user liability may arise.27 First, in the absence of a binding approved tariff or
licence agreement, a person who infringes copyright is liable in damages to the copyright
owner for damages suffered from the infringement.28 Those damages are assessed by
the court.29 Second, in the presence of an approved tariff (or licence agreement) to which
a user is bound, the owner’s legal claim is based on enforcing the tariff (or licence
agreement) not copyright infringement, allowing collection of royalties set out in the tariff
(or licence agreement).30 Justice Pelletier noted this distinction is blurred when courts use
a collective society approved tariff to calculate damages in instances of copyright
infringement. This might explain why an assumption that collective societies can enforce
tariffs against any copyright infringers has developed over time.31 The FCA scrutinized
the veracity of this assumption to determine when is a user of copyright works actually
bound by a tariff, triggering its enforcement in case of non payment, as opposed to the
general regime of liability for damages in case of copyright infringement.

Following a detailed historical statutory analysis of the Act concerning collective societies,
tariffs, individual license agreements, the approval process by the Copyright Board,
Justice Pelletier came to the conclusion that tariffs are non-mandatory but rather
consensual between the user and the collective society.32

The FCA interpreted

successive amendments to the Act and relied on a decision of the Supreme Court which
interpreted licence agreements with royalty rates fixed by the Copyright Board as

27

Supra note 1 at para 38.
Act, supra note 3, s 35(1).
29 Supra note 1 at para 38.
30 Ibid.
31 Supra note 1 at paras 38-39.
32 Ibid at para 202. The FCA acknowledged referring to the analysis provided by Professor Ariel Katz,
“Spectre: Canadian Copyright and the Mandatory Tariff – Part I” (2015) 27 IPJ 151 (arguing that tariffs
approved by the Copyright Board are not mandatory).
28
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remaining voluntary for users: Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. SODRAC 2003 Inc.33 In
doing so, the FCA rejected Access Copyright’s argument that tariffs approved by the
Copyright Board gave rise to a regime distinct from licence agreements that collective
societies conclude with specific users from time to time (e.g. licence agreement between
SODRAC and CBC).34 Tariffs and licence agreements are two different means to achieve
the same result, the former being typically intended for general application to different
undefined users in the future, and in the latter case to specific pre-determined user(s).35

The requirement of Copyright Board approval for tariffs and licence agreements is meant
to safeguard the public interest against the strong powers that a collective society may
otherwise exert against potential copyright users.36 The more general application of tariffs
to a potentially larger group of users (allowing lower transaction costs for collective
societies and users)37 than a specific license agreement, does not detract from tariffs’
consensual nature. As a result, Access Copyright is not entitled to enforce the terms of
its approved or interim tariffs against non-licensees such as is the case with York.38 And
while Justice Pelletier acknowledged the more limited appeal for Access Copyright and
other collective societies to file tariffs for approval if they are not mandatory (i.e. not
enforceable against all alleged infringing users performing acts falling within the scope of
any given approved tariff), this alone is insufficient to support their mandatory nature in
light of the statutory history and analysis pointing to the contrary.39

The FCA reasons for judgment are compelling and the decision is important as it is the
first to address in recent times the enforceability of collective society tariffs at such

33

Supra note 2 at paras 105-107 (on the interpretation of the Act, supra note 3, s. 70.2); FCA decision,
supra note 1 at paras 112-114 (citing the SCC on the general principle requiring explicit terms in the Act if
the intent was to mandatorily impose a pecuniary burden on users without their consent).
34 Supra note 1 at paras 43,44,97, 116, 132-132, 151, 138-146 (on Access Copyright pointing to
amendments to the Act which separated tariffs approved by the Copyright Board and administered by
collective societies, and arguing that tariffs were a form of regulation, and on reasons for rejecting those
arguments, difference in language in Act, supra note 3, s. 68.2(1) being inconsequential when read in
conjunction with mission of collective societies.
35 Ibid at paras 178-179.
36 Ibid at para 191.
37 Ibid at paras 200-201.
38 Ibid at para 204.
39 Ibid at para 203.
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length.40 If upheld by the Supreme Court, the short term gain for York and other
educational institutions having opted out of the Interim Tariff is that Access Copyright has
no recourse for royalty payments until York and others agree to be bound by the Interim
Tariff or through separate negotiated licence agreement between the parties. And unless
Access Copyright gains standing to sue for copyright infringement on behalf of copyright
holders to its repertoire (as is the case for other collective societies),41 copyright holders,
assignees, and exclusive licensees alone can file such claims directly against York and
other educational institutions. The recognized consensual nature of licence agreements
and tariffs alike could also encourage openness between the negotiating parties,
including greater transparency with respect to Access Copyright’s repertoire.

Given the shift towards digital collections licensing increasingly covering a large part of
educational institution needs, and correlatively, the progressively declining value of
Access Copyright licence to its repertoire, some value could remain in agreeing to be
bound by Access Copyright’s Interim Tariff or licence. Access Copyright licences provide
a broad indemnification to licensees against copyright infringement claims,42 and the Act
limits the liability of educational institutions against copyright holders not covered by
collective societies schemes when a licence agreement or tariff is in place.43 A licence
agreement or tariff may thus act as a risk management tool and offer peace of mind to
educational institutions. The question is to what extent this additional peace of mind is
required and what it is worth.44 Additionally, the value of an Access Copyright licence to
educational institutions is tied to the scope of their user rights to copyright materials
encapsulated in large part in the fair dealing provisions of the Act, which is explored next.

40

Ibid at paras 195-199 (FCA citing previous decisions where tariffs were enforced against copyright
infringers, often through default judgments or where the (non)mandatory nature of tariff was not
discussed at length).
41 See supra note 14.
42 AUCC Model license and Interim Tariff, supra note 10 at para 2, provide an indemnity to licensed
users. However the final tariff approved by the Copyright Board does not contain an indemnity clause, the
Copyright Board deeming it not necessary after removing “non-affiliates” from scope of Access
Copyright’s license: Approved Tariff Decision, supra note 19 at paras 68, 198, 154,155.
43 Act, supra note 3, s. 38.2.
44 Geist, supra note 19 (arguing there is limited legal risk of not signing a licence with Access Copyright
overall).
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5. Fair Dealing in Canadian Copyright Law
In the second part of the decision, Justice Pelletier turned to York’s counterclaim seeking
declaratory relief on whether York’s Guidelines constituted fair dealing under the Act.45
Fair dealing with a work does not constitute copyright infringement and does not require
authorization or remuneration from the copyright holder. Normally raised as a defence to
copyright infringement, here the fair dealing analysis did not follow a copyright
infringement claim against York, Access Copyright having no standing against York for
such claim.46

Having ruled that the Interim Tariff was not mandatory hence not enforceable against
York, the possible relationship between the Interim Tariff and York’s fair dealing became
moot, at least regarding the litigation opposing Access Copyright to York. The value of
the declaratory relief remained to provide guidance to York (and similar educational
institutions) on an unsettled legal matter, and vis-à-vis copyright holders who may
contemplate a copyright infringement suit against York in the future. Accordingly, the
FCA proceeded on the fair dealing analysis.
In a trilogy of cases, i.e. CCH,47 followed by SOCAN,48 and Alberta Education,49 the
Supreme Court developed a two-step test to determine the fairness of a dealing with
copyright work(s). The first part of the test asks whether the use falls within one allowable
purpose and the second part whether the dealing is fair.

How should the two-step test apply to guidelines set by large educational institutions?
Whose perspective matters in assessing fairness? York’s? Its instructors’? The students’?
How may York’s practices with copyright works as exemplified in York’s (and other)
Guidelines have an impact on the relevant market segment for copyright holders? These
45

Act, supra note 3, ss. 29-29.2.
See Supra note 14.
47 Supra note 6.
48 Supra note 7.
49 Ibid.
46
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have been controversial questions at the heart of copyright law debates of the last
decade50 and the ones facing the FCA.

(i)

First step: Allowable Purposes

Starting with the first step of the test, the FCA pointed out that it was met by York without
contention, i.e. that its practices under the Guidelines were for one of the allowable
purposes of education,51 although York’s counterclaim did not limit itself solely to the
purpose of education.52 Placing less emphasis on the first part of the test as the FCA did
is consistent with the approach adopted in CCH and in SOCAN, calling for a large and
liberal interpretation of the allowable purposes enumerated in the fair dealing provisions.53

The FCA (and the FC before that) did not elaborate on what the purpose of education
entails and this is unfortunate for at least two reasons. First, “education” is among the
newcomers of allowable purposes introduced to the Act in 2012, and it has not yet been
addressed by Canadian courts. The addition by Parliament of “education” in 2012 ought
to bear a distinct meaning from the other listed purposes in the Act, in particular “research
or private study”, or “criticism and review”, also relevant for educational institutions.54 The
addition of “education” to fair dealing also ought to be interpreted in light of the already
pre-existing detailed list of specific exceptions to copyright infringement for educational
institutions.55 The education purpose was added to the fair dealing provisions to offer
50

Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Statutory Review of the Copyright Act,
(June 2019) at 55- 65, online (pdf): Our Commons
<www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INDU/Reports/RP10537003/indurp16/indurp16e.pdf>(Review of various submissions regarding fair dealing for the purpose of education, the Committee
recommending more consultation and data gathering, with no amendments to the Act at this point).
51 FCA decision, supra note 1 at para 211.
52 Ibid at para 2 (i.e. that all copying made in compliance with the Guidelines constituted fair dealing under
the Act, ss. 29, 29.1 or 29.2).
53 CCH, supra note 6 at paras 48, 51; SOCAN, supra note 7, at para 27 (stating that CCH set a relatively
low threshold for the first part of the test and that the “heavy-hitting” took place at the second step of the
test, when establishing the fairness of the dealing).
54 Prior to the addition of “education” to the fair dealing provisions in 2012, the Supreme Court had
suggested otherwise in Alberta Education, supra note 7 at para 23 (regarding purpose of research and
private study and purpose of educating as being tautological).
55 Act, supra note 3, ss 29.4-30.04. For instance, and unlike these specific exceptions, nothing suggests
that fair dealing for the purpose of education can only be invoked by educational institutions. See CCH,

11
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808146

more flexibility to educational institutions than a specific list of permitted acts allows, and
by the same token expand the scope of permissible acts without the consent of copyright
holders.56

Second and more importantly, the purpose of the dealing is pivotal to the fairness
assessment (second part) of the test, e.g. when courts evaluate fairness in light of the
amount of the dealing of the relevant work(s).57 Elaborating on the purpose of education
could have alleviated some of the difficulties the FCA (and the FC before that) faced in
assessing the fairness of York’s Guidelines. It would help further expand the
jurisprudence directly relevant to educational institutions beyond Alberta Education,
where the Supreme Court applied fair dealing, but for the purpose of research and private
study, not education, which had not then come into force.58
The added purpose of “education” requires one to think as much about the teachers and
instructors as users and beneficiaries of the works, and not just the students. Education
involves a process that is by no means linear or unidirectional.59 The selection of materials
is central to instructors’ course design, objectives, and teaching philosophy. Instructors’
course objectives, skill, creativity, and unique teaching style are an integral part of that
selection process. Flexibility is required as part of that process,60 even more so at postsecondary level, where academic freedom is a defining trait of the relationship instructor-

supra note 6 at para 49 (on the co-existence between fair dealing and specific exceptions to copyright
infringement, as not being mutually exclusive). See Carys J. Craig & Bob Tarantino ““An Hundred Stories
in Ten Days”: COVID-19 Lessons for Culture, Learning, and Copyright Law” (2020) 57 Osgoode Hall Law
Journal 567, at 591-592 (commenting on the complexity of various user rights or exceptions to copyright
infringement as being less than optimal for educational institutions).
56 Michael Geist, “Fairness Found: How Canada Quietly Shifted from Fair Dealing to Fair Use”, in M. Geist
ed. The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian
Copyright Law (UOP, 2013) 157 at 176-180 (commenting on expansion of listed purposes under fair
dealing provisions and jurisprudential developments bringing fair dealing in Canada closer to fair use
model where there is no closed list of stated purposes).
57 See discussion below on the second part of the test where courts assess the fairness of the dealing
through a six- factor analysis.
58 See supra note 3.
59 Canadian Oxford Dictionary, 2d (2004) “education”, refers to “the act or process of educating or being
educated”.
60 See FC decision, supra note11 at paras 326-7 (court accepting evidence that days of single textbooks
per course are long gone and pointing to educational benefits for instructors and students to tailor unique
course packs).
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students and instructor-institution. In a fair dealing analysis “for the purpose of education”,
instructors need to be included among (if not as main) users of copyright works, as
immediate beneficiaries of the materials selected for their course, along with the
students,.

A deeper assessment of the scope of the purpose of education in the first part of the fair
dealing analysis would have assisted the FCA (and FC prior to that) in answering the
following central questions in the second part of the test: who are the users? Should we
assess the fairness of the dealing from the perspective of York as institution? From the
perspective of York’s instructors? Its students? From all?

(ii)

Second Step: Assessing Fairness

The second step of the fair dealing analysis considers the non-exhaustive list of six factors
laid out in CCH to determine whether the dealing is “fair”, with varying degrees of
relevance and application on a case by case basis.61 The factors are: (1) the purpose of
the dealing; (2) the character of the dealing; (3) the amount of the dealing; (4) alternatives
to the dealing; (5) the nature of the work; and (6) the effect of the dealing on the work”.62
The party relying on “fair dealing” has the burden of satisfying elements under the CCH
test, except for the last factor, which falls on the plaintiff.63 When the dealing in question
is a general practice such as York’s Guidelines, the burden of proof can be discharged
by proving the fairness of the practice without having to prove that each dealing pursuant
to the practice is fair.64

In considering the fairness factors and their application in CCH, SOCAN, and Alberta
Education, the FCA upheld the FC decision that reproductions made under York’s
Guidelines did not necessarily constitute fair dealing, York having failed to show that the
FC erred in its assessment of the fair dealing factors subject to the applicable standard
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CCH supra note 6 at para 53.
Ibid.
63 Ibid at para 72.
64 Ibid at para 63.
62
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of review. The FCA devoted a significant portion of its fairness analysis to the first factor,
the “purpose of the dealing”. This factor is often conflated with the first part of the test
regarding the allowable purposes, as the FCA noted, commenting on the FC decision. 65
While the purpose of the dealing in the first part of the test is relevant throughout the
fairness assessment of the dealing, the purpose factor looks into the goal or motive of the
dealing (e.g. whether the research and private study is performed to a commercial or
charitable end),66 or a separate interest of the entity dealing the work(s) from the allowable
purpose, which could tilt the dealing toward unfairness.67 The FCA left the FC’s factual
assessment undisturbed, i.e. that York’s purpose in issuing its Guidelines was “to obtain
for free that which [it] had previously paid for” and “to keep enrolment up by keeping
student costs down and to use whatever savings there may be in other parts of the
university’s operation”.68

Distinguishing this case from CCH, SOCAN and Alberta Education, the FCA held that in
an institutional claim based on general practice, it is the institution’s perspective (i.e. York)
that matters in assessing the fairness of the dealing at the second part of the test. 69 The
FCA did so by liking this case to CCH whereby in the opinion of the FCA, the Supreme
Court considered the perspective of the Great Library in assessing the fairness of its
Access Policy under which the Great Library and its patrons could reproduce works
protected by copyright.70 The FCA distinguished this case from SOCAN whereby the
streaming of excerpts of musical works was made by potential buyers directly 71 which
justified the Supreme Court to focus on the end users’ individual perspective and not the
one of Bell Canada in the aggregate. The FCA also distinguished this case from Alberta
Education which as characterized by the FCA, concerned reproductions made by
teachers on an ad hoc basis, not pursuant to institutionalized general practices,72 and
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Supra note 1at para 241 (FCA pointing out that FC made an overriding and palpable error in bringing in
the education purpose under the analysis of the first factor of the fairness analysis).
66 CCH, supra note 6 at para 56.
67 Alberta Education, supra note 7 at para 22.
68 Supra note 1 at para 240.
69 Ibid at para 238.
70 Ibid at paras 219-222.
71 Ibid at para 223.
72
Supra note 1 at paras 232-233.
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whereby the Supreme Court found that the purpose of teachers aligned with the purpose
of its students’ research and private study.73
The FCA’s position that it is York’s perspective that matters in institutional claims based
on general practice sets aside York’s argument that the students’ perspective is the one
that matters, which in effect would lead to an individualized approach to the dealings
rather than looking at the reproductions made at the institutional level, in the aggregate.
With respect, this part of the FCA analysis is flawed for at least three reasons.

First, it is not entirely accurate to state that in CCH, it was solely the perspective of the
Great Library that mattered to assess the fairness of the dealing,74 nor was it the case in
SOCAN.75 In each decision, the Supreme Court evaluated the fairness of the dealing both
through the steps that were taken at the institutional or company level and at the level of
its intended beneficiaries or end users (i.e. library patrons, consumers, or students).

Second, to the extent that the allowed purpose of education ought to be given a distinct
meaning from research or private study, Faculty and instructors are individually end users
as much if not more than the students. As a result, York is both dealing with the works at
the institutional level in setting and implementing the Guidelines, and a user beneficiary
of the works reproduced through its instructors. It is thus more accurate to assess the
fairness of the dealing from the perspective of York as an institution setting the Guidelines
and through its faculty and instructors, as well as from the students’ perspective. This
might provide a more nuanced view of fairness than was portrayed by the FCA, by
recognizing that in large part the dealing made by instructors is for their direct individual
benefit in pursuing their mandate and goals as educators and for the benefit of each
student within the purview of the allowable purpose of education.
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Alberta Education, supra note 7 at paras 228-231.
CCH supra note 6 at para 56 (while considering the practice of the Great Library in its fairness analysis,
the Supreme Court also considers the end user perspective, i.e. whether the research or private study is
for commercial or charitable purposes).
75 SOCAN, supra note 7 at para 34 (Supreme Court emphasized the perspective of the end users in
addressing the fairness of the dealing).
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Third, to characterize York’s motive behind the Guidelines as primarily one to get away
with paying fees to Access Copyright by having opted out of the Interim Tariff misses
important and reasonable goals for York to implement Guidelines. Ensuring a systematic
approach to making full use of fair dealing for its own benefit and the one of its students,
addressing lawfulness, and managing the risk of copyright infringement are legitimate
goals that York’s Guidelines sought to achieve, pointing toward more fairness than that
portrayed by the FC and FCA. On this point, it is somewhat counter intuitive that the FCA
and FC had a priori more sympathy to find fairness in what they characterized as ad hoc
type of reproductions made by teachers in Alberta Education, than for a more systematic
and concerted approach normally found in general practices similar to York’s
Guidelines.76
The “character of the dealing” (second factor of the fairness analysis) looks at how the
work is dealt with, i.e. the amount of reproductions made; multiple as opposed to single
copies of a work tending toward unfairness.77 The FCA distinguished this case from CCH
where evidence pointed toward single copies being made under the Great Library Access
Policy whereas under York Guidelines, multiple copies of works were made for multiple
users and therefore pointed toward unfairness.78 As noted by the FC and FCA, referring
to CCH, this factor tends to disfavour educational institutions where instructors’ dealing
with works will ordinarily and necessarily involve multiple copies.79 The FCA suggested
how guidelines restricting further copying by students and asking for destruction of copies
after use could make the dealing more fair, pointing out to the absence of such safeguards
in York’s Guidelines.80

The character of the dealing factor highlights perhaps more than any other the current
gap of direction on how to apply fair dealing for the purpose of education, as most dealings
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Supra note 1 at paras 232- 233 (distinguishing the facts in Alberta Education from CCH and the present
case as in Alberta Education the copies were not made pursuant to a policy or guidelines (“the absence

of a practice or system suggests that the copying was ad hoc and not systematic”).
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CCH, supra note 6 at paras 55, 67.
Supra note 1 at para 256.
79 Ibid at paras 243,244,256.
80 Ibid at para 253.
78

16
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808146

might be viewed as unfair under this factor. This view, as entertained by the FC and FCA
should be resisted. The dealing of works through multiple reproductions will more often
than not be a requirement in an educational context. Multiple copies should not be viewed
as unfair or inconsistent with CCH because they are typically confined to a specific
classroom or group; they are not widely distributed.81 In addition, and contrary to what
the FCA suggests, Alberta Education involved multiple copies of works made upon
several teachers’ initiative for the benefit of their students, which dealing was held to be
made for research and private study and to be fair.82 Finally, holding that multiple
reproductions tend toward unfairness would significantly reduce fair dealing in scope
when applied to the purpose of education and devoid it of substance. Such interpretation
is antithetical to the purpose of education and is inconsistent with CCH and subsequent
decisions by the Supreme Court stating that fair dealing as a user right calls for a large
and liberal interpretation.83
By contrast to the character of the dealing, the third factor, “amount of the dealing” deals
with the portion of the work that is copied relative to the whole work. The FCA
acknowledged that this factor did not involve any assessment of the amount of copies
made in the aggregate.84 The fairness needs to be assessed relative to the underlying
purpose of the dealing;85 for example the reproduction of a whole painting might be fair
in the context of criticism and review while the reproduction of a whole book would likely
not under most circumstances or purposes. The application of this factor illustrates how
the second step of the fair dealing test is intimately tied to the first. The FCA noted how
in CCH, the Great Library Access Policy contained safeguards for any copying that
exceeded the permitted percentage of copying. By contrast, the FCA underscored that
York had failed to prove how its Guidelines were fair from the perspective of the student
users, e.g. by justifying the basis of the percentage of copying of the whole work set by
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CCH, supra note 6 at para 55 (referring to multiple copies being widely distributed as leaning toward
unfairness [emphasis added]).
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Supra note 7 at para 7, 11.
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CCH, supra note 6 at para 48, 51; SOCAN, supra note 7 at para 11; Keatey, supra note 7 at para 45.
84 Supra note 1 at para 279 (acknowledging the FC palpable but not overriding error on that point).
85 CCH, supra note 6 at para 56.
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the Guidelines.86 As a result, the FCA sided with the FC application of this factor pointing
toward unfairness. Regarding the reasonableness of the thresholds, consideration could
have been given to AUCC Guidelines and guidelines similar to York’s used by several
post-secondary educational institutions as indication of accepted and followed norms.87
The fourth factor “alternatives to the dealing” requires one, as per CCH, to assess whether
the dealing was reasonably necessary to achieve the allowable purpose and whether
there are available non-copyright alternatives to the dealing.88 In CCH, the Supreme Court
also stated that the availability of a licence is irrelevant to assess fairness under this
factor, as to hold otherwise would unduly favour copyright holders in a manner
inconsistent with the balance within copyright law.89 The FCA reasons are brief on this
factor, leaving undisturbed FC’s finding that York’s dealing was reasonably necessary for
the ultimate purpose of educating students, while noting that the reproductions involved
were systematic and significantly larger than in Alberta Education, and that York did not
actively pursue alternatives. In the end, this factor tended toward fairness and favoured
York.90

It is notable that the FCA does not consider this factor more closely from the perspective
of York and the Guidelines as an institutional practice and that it did not distinguish the
case at hand from CCH, as it did with the other factors. One may wonder in the context
of educational institution guidelines, the extent to which the availability of a licence is
always irrelevant to the assessment of fairness, and whether some distinction from CCH
is warranted.

From a fairness assessment standpoint, the availability of a licence should not be
determinant and is irrelevant in many instances, e.g. when reproductions are made for
purposes of criticism, review, news reporting, or parody, for which it would be impractical
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Supra note 1 at paras 280-281.
See CCH, supra note 6 at para 55 (on the value of resorting to Industry customary practices).
88 Ibid at para 57.
89 Ibid at para 70.
90 Supra note 1 at paras 284-292.
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if not impossible to obtain a licence. To say otherwise would eviscerate the core function
of the fair dealing doctrine as a user right which sets boundaries to exclusive copyrights
by allowing certain uses and dissemination of works, the creation of new ones, and
respect for freedom of expression in conformity with the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.91

It is quite a different thing to say that the availability of a licence should be irrelevant in all
cases.92 From a fairness perspective, the availability of a licence meeting the needs of an
instructor could be relevant at the early stages of developing course materials, while for
obvious practicality reasons, it may not be as relevant in the middle of a course with
respect to ad hoc copying, where time constraints may preclude an instructor from
accessing the licence but barring access to the work would impede spontaneity and
deprive the instructor and the students accessing important material for their learning. As
the fairness of a dealing weighs in the importance of accessing and disseminating works
relative to the exclusive copyrights involved, the convenience factor ought to be
considered regarding the relevance of an existing licence as it was in CCH (for other
matter than availability of the licence).93 For instance when there is an exact same
licenced alternative available on the market, such as licensing segments vs purchasing
entire works, arguing that the availability of a licence would be entirely irrelevant would
go against the “effect of the dealing” considered in a fairness analysis, which we now turn
to.
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s 7, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
On the interaction between Canadian copyright law and freedom of expression, see e.g. Graham
Reynolds, “Moving Past Michelin: Towards Judicial Reconsideration of the Intersection of Copyright and
the Charter Right to Freedom of Expression” (2017) 30 I.P.J. 25.
92 In a US context, see e.g. Cambridge University Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (2014), at 1276-1277
(in the context of a fair use analysis pursuant to Copyright Act, 17 USC, s. 107, stating that availability of
licence for educational institutions not determinative although its presence may make the use less fair
than if no licence is available for the unauthorized use). See however Amira Dotan, Niva Elkin-Koren, Orit
Fischman-Afori & Ronit Haramati-Alpern, “Fair Use Best Practices for Higher Education Institutions: The
Israeli Experience (2010) 57 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 447, at 452 (“The selection of teaching materials
should not be based on the ability to acquire a license, the restrictions of a license or the license fee”).
93 CCH, supra note 6 at para 69, where the convenience factor weighed in the analysis of alternatives to
the dealing in a different manner, i.e. having patrons come to the Great Library to view the materials was
not a reasonable alternative to Great Library staff faxing reproductions of said works to them.
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The fifth factor that the FCA considered, “effect of the dealing”, looks at the impact of the
dealing on the market of the original copyright works; competition with such market
leaning toward unfairness.94 Although an important factor, the Supreme Court in CCH
emphasized it was not the most important one. This is in keeping with the Court
recognizing the breadth and scope that befits “user rights”. It signals that some impinging
effect on the market of the original work would not necessarily be a bar to a dealing being
fair overall.

The FCA underscored that the copying allowed pursuant to the York Guidelines was
significantly higher than in any of the Supreme Court trilogy of cases. York failed to prove
an overriding and palpable error in FC’s conclusion that the Guidelines had (will) cause
significant negative impacts on the market for which Access Copyright would otherwise
be compensated for York’s copying.95

To accept a likely correlation between decline in revenue for the post-secondary
education market and the Guidelines, causing significant negative impacts in the market,
is perplexing for many reasons. First, guidelines give direction and boundaries for
reproduction and other uses of copyright works when the same are not already covered
under transactional digital licences or specific user rights under the Act;96 they do not
command a predictable amount of copying at any given point in time, making it near to
impossible to make such correlation.

Second, the FC resorting to the difference between a licence fee and no licence fee paid
to Access Copyright to show the negative effect of the Guidelines on the market for the
works covered by Access Copyright’s repertoire assumes that such licence fees were
actually owed to AC.97 As discussed earlier, there are legitimate reasons why York and
other educational institutions may decide that Access Copyright’s licence is not required,
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Supra note 1 at para 302; CCH, supra note 6 at para 59.
FC decision, supra note 11 at para 353; Supra note 1 at para 306: York’s copying leaning toward
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96 Act, supra note 3, ss. 29.4-30.04 (exceptions to copyright infringement for educational institutions).
97 Supra note 1 at paras 350-351.
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i.e. considering all other digital licences to which York is already a party, as well as given
the expansion of fair dealing and other user rights under the Act. Resorting to the
difference between York paying or not paying AC’s Interim Tariff (or licence fee before
that) as evidence of the negative effect of the dealing on the market is flawed. It amounts
to making a foregone conclusion about the intrinsic value of Access Copyright’s licence
which in turn creates an impediment to making a successful claim of fair dealing, a matter
quite distinct from Access Copyright’s Interim Tariff or licences.

Finally, in case of reproduction for the purpose of research, private study, education, it is
difficult to clearly delineate the actual effect of reproductions on the market of the original
work. Unlike dealings for the purpose of criticism or review, parody or satire where it may
be clearer to assert that the product incorporating the original work (e.g. the criticism or
parody) is distinct and therefore no substitute for the original work, reproductions for
research, private study, or education will usually be identical to (portions of) the original
work. This said, save clear cases where a reproduction is a reasonable substitution for
the work and therefore competes with it (e.g. reproducing an entire book) it will be near
impossible to prove when a reproduction actually competes with the market for the
original work. For that, one would need to prove that had the user had no access to a
reproduction, they would most likely have purchased or licenced a copy. Allowing
reproductions as fair dealing in that indeterminate zone expands dissemination of the
work without competing with the market of the right holder, not only benefiting users but
copyright holders as well. The difficulty lies in assessing where the tipping point lies. At
the same time, as this factor is not the most important one, some potential impingement
on the market of right holders will not be a bar to successfully relying on fair dealing
overall, allowing some wiggle room for the scope of allowable reproductions or other acts
without the authorization of copyright holders.

This is where the effect of the dealing on the market of the work ties to the previous factor,
i.e., alternatives to the dealing. The evolution of different licensing models redefines the
market of right holders. For example, publishers may be willing to license book chapters
for limited duration rather than require purchase of an entire book. In such a scenario, the
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reproduction of a chapter becomes a substitute for the existing licence to the chapter and
would compete directly with that offering. As such, to discard the existence of such
licences as irrelevant would go against the application of the factor looking at the effect
of the dealing on the original work as it is currently interpreted.

The FCA addressed the nature of the work as the last factor, very briefly. In line with
CCH, and SOCAN, the FC noted that works in Access Copyright repertoire are meant to
be disseminated, while pointing out that authors did not need York Guidelines to
achieve this goal.98 The FCA noted FC’s reasons, uncontested by York, that this factor
pointed toward unfairness. In arriving at this conclusion, the FC seems to have
disregarded the fact that the works in Access Copyright’s repertoire were meant to be
widely disseminated, which should have pointed the dealing toward fairness. Rather,
the FC resorted back to the other factors such as the character of the dealing and the
manner in which the Guidelines were applied.

6. Conclusion
Four observations follow from the FC and FCA decisions on the unfairness of York’s
Guidelines. First, specific to this case, York’s decision to opt out of Access Copyright’s
Interim Tariff led to the inference that York Guidelines were used as a shield to avoid
paying for the Access Copyright licence or Interim Tariff and copyright materials more
generally. York’s ongoing investments in library materials and publisher licensing
agreements paint a different picture. York’s opting out of Access Copyright’s Interim Tariff
combined with the implementation of York’s Guidelines led the FC and FCA to conclude
that York’s Guidelines were unfair. York’s opting out of the Interim Tariff led to the
inference that the Guidelines impacted the educational publishing market negatively, and
toward a finding of unfairness. The facts of the case failed to present the extent to which
York had to resort to fair dealing, i.e. the amount of reproductions not already covered by
the transactional licences between York and various publishers. Nor did the facts present
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what the Access Copyright Interim Tariff covered relative to the publishers’ transactional
licences. Viewed in this light, one may question the links the FCA and FC made between
York’s opting out of Access Copyright’s Interim Tariff and the fairness of York’s
Guidelines.

Second, the FCA and FC decisions illustrate the important test fair dealing is being put
through when it comes to large educational institution general guidelines. For almost two
decades, much hope has been placed in fair dealing as a doctrine facilitating a more
balanced copyright system, through a recognition that user rights are integral to it. Can
fair dealing live up to such expectations when applied to guidelines with potentially broad
application and ramifications in educational institution environments?99 Or will fair dealing
be relegated to successfully applying only to ad hoc, limited copying as suggested by the
FC and FCA, in reference to Alberta Education? As much as fair dealing calls for flexibility
and broadness in its application, too many unknowns regarding the magnitude of
reproductions involved will tend to play against the educational institution seeking to
establish fairness.

Third, given that educational institutions bear the bulk of the burden of proof,
demonstrating fairness will require narrowing the gap of unknowns when it comes to
general guidelines of broad application. Documenting and communicating how fair
dealing guidelines fall within the broader educational institution day-to-day handling of
copyright works (e.g. acts already allowed under transactional publisher licences,
handling of course packs, application of other exceptions to copyright infringement)100 will
help narrow a perceived gap toward fairness. In that vein, the role of librarians as
educators and gatekeepers will continue to be instrumental toward ensuring and
documenting fairness.
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Finally, fair dealing is only one among several vehicles toward promoting adequate
availability and access to educational materials. The essence of copyright and other
intellectual property rights is to enable authors and other right holders to choose when
and how they allow others to access their works. More can be done by educational
institutions, public research funding agencies, faculty members to promote and
encourage even more open access models of scholarship dissemination.101
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